Kermer, "Politics, the Muslim Community and Hindu-Muslim Relations: Considered North India in the early 16th century."

RETHINKING A MILLENNIUM
Perspectives on Indian History from the Eighth to the Eighteenth Century
ESSAYS FOR HARBANS MUKHIA

Edited by Rajat Datta
Chapter 6
Politics, the Muslim Community and Hindu-Muslim Relations Reconsidered: North India in the Early Thirteenth Century

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Introduction

Historians of medieval India were slow to recogtise the potential of trying to encapsulate medieval social sensibilities within a modern, English lexicon. To be sure, in the 1920s the British civil servant and historian, W.H. Moreland, was among his colleagues in suggesting that the 'translation' of Persian administrative technical terms within British frames of reference interfered with the comprehension of medieval Indian history. Having said that, Moreland did not go far and worry whether the pivotal role he ascribed to administrative institutions and political agencies in the shaping of economic life was derived from his own experiences with modernity. As an officer committed to the programme of a bureaucratic based colonial regime in India and a historian with a positivist training, he valorised the rationality organised, centralised state introduced by the British.

It is, however, altogether too easy to criticise Moreland, or almost any other turn of the century historian, forgetting for the moment that historians are forced to seize words and terminologies from their own milieu to retrospectively identify problems and periods in history. Today, however, one would expect historians to be more attentive to the subjectivities that they encounter in a post-modernist world and to work their terminologies more carefully in the contexts of the medieval past. A few exceptions notwithstanding, the gridlock of a presentist vocabulary has challenged attempts to seize the histories of attitudes and identities of the pre-modern world. A paucity of materials for such a study is a refrain that is sometimes voiced. Indeed, unlike the early modern period, sources that might facilitate the study of individual and collective identities are not easily available to the historian. There are no documentary records of court cases where prescription and prescription were debated, very little pertaining to a public culture where social mores were displayed and reproduced. But equally, the inability to move beyond the narratives of the sources at hand is also a methodological problem, a product of a naive empiricism that follows "authoritative" sources and their narratives as repositories of dependable and verifiable information.

It is important to bear in mind that even as medieval Persian chronicles recount the migration of dispersed groups of Muslims into the subcontinent and detail a history of considerable competition and strife among these people, the politics of this heterogeneity is not a subject that they choose to develop. They focus instead upon how a cohesive, monolithic Muslim community bravely overcame the challenges of living in an "alien land." One historian characterised these narratives as "epics of conquest," eulogies expanding on the achievements of the victorious Muslim armies. Not surprisingly, these epics of conquest produced "counter-epics of resistance" in their wake, where the valour of Rajput arms against foreign invaders received their due. There was little historiographical interaction with these materials. Writing at the height of communal polarisation, the distinguished scholar A.B.M. Habibullah concluded:

"Religious war" was bound to occur in territories which had an unbroken tradition of Hindu rule, and there it was that the Muslim Turks met with real and sustained opposition. Not only were they of an alien race but were followers of a religion which had little in common with that practised in India. Hindus had amazing powers of assimilation; it had absorbed countless peoples in the past whose identity is lost now lost in the mists of Indian society and culture. But that the Muslims, they had preserved their identity and refused compromise in religion. For the first time in his history, India was to recognise itself to the existence of a separate culture-community.

A resurgence of communal violence in the 1990s once again drew historiographical interest to the pre-history of communal distinctions. Although many historians were by now more careful of presentist readings of the past, they attempted to avoid anachronistic conclusions by being carefully positivistic in their methodologies. Empiricism without any theoretical dominance, however, displayed an extreme value in dealing with medieval sources. Peter Jackson's work on the political and military history of the Delhi Sultanate was noteworthy for its diligent reading of Persian materials on military campaigns and administrative terminology. Jackson could point out biases, exaggerations, even contradictions in his sources, but his
the 'core' regions of the middle Ganges plain. But elsewhere, he remarked that 'creative encounters' between Muslims and non-Muslims occurred more generally in the subcontinent during the fifteenth, sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. These coincided with the period when the Delhi Sultanate and Mughal states had declined, which is why 'Imperial visions of Islam were replaced by more localized perceptions.' There was consistency in Eaton's arguments, whether he was discussing Punjab, Bengal or the larger subcontinent: political agency and history were more genuinely manifested among subject peoples, Muslims and Hindus both, when the heavy hand of the state was weak. This argument was, of course, cogently supported by medieval Sultanate and Mughal court historians. In their narratives, the hegemony of the state was unquestioned and political initiatives expressed by subject populations were viewed with the greatest suspicion. 'Tribes', sedition and rebellion, against legitimate political authority, was the extreme representation of political agency by subject peoples and, not surprisingly, it always carried a negative connotation in the documentation produced by the state. As Eaton put it, while the state was strong, it suppressed 'creative encounters' were possible during the period of its decline. As a result, even though Eaton researched the slow processes of community formations and argued against the concept of 'Hindu-Muslim' communalism being a Christian mapping of the modern world, he remained trapped in the juxtaposition between the state and the subjects imposed upon him by the order of his sources. Like Moreland before him, he was sensitive to one set of problems historians face in using medieval Persian documentation but was nonetheless restrained by his desire to understand this expansion of the Delhi region of the subcontinent.

My paper follows - things and space circumscribed as its central theme, the Punjab, Sindhi, and the period of the foundation of 'Muslim' and 'Hindu' communities as they recurred in the literature. In its form, the study was the literature involved in its formal resistance and counter part initiatives. The identity with many individuals felt was misguided by perspective. I would define 'Muslim' communities in political terms.
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importance of the frontier with the ‘Hindu Other’ in the fashioning of this consciousness.

Conflict and the Early Muslim Community: two episodes

On the 8th of December 1313 (10th Ramazan, 719 A.H.) Nizam al-Din Awliya narrated an anecdote regarding the Sufi Shaykh Jalal al-Din Tabrizi, who was strongly reproached by the Shaykh al-Islam of Delhi, Najm al-Din Syedha. The conflict between the two snowballed to such an extent that Jalal al-Din Tabrizi left Delhi. Jalal migrated to Budhun where one day he had a prescient vision of Najm al-Din Syedha’s death. After a funeral prayer for the Shaykh al-Islam of Delhi, Jalal migrated to the town, my Shaykh expelled him from this world. Although Nizam al-Din Awliya’s narrative remained enigmatic about the reasons for Jalal al-Din’s exile, his disapproval of Najm al-Din Syedha’s conduct was evident enough to his listeners.

As by the Shaykh al-Islam of Delhi, Najm al-Din Syedha was involved in another case of expulsion, this time of the Sufi Shaykh Qutb al-Din Bakhtiyar Kaki. This story was first narrated in the mid-fourteenth century biographical encyclopedia, Sijar al-Awliya. The anecdote started with a reminder to the audience about the close friendship between Murin al-Din Chashni (the spiritual master of Qutb al-Din) and Najm al-Din Syedha. It was in the context of the friendship between the two protagonists that Murin al-Din was struck by Najm al-Din’s haughtiness and coldness during one of his rare visits to Delhi. Murin al-Din wondered if the change in the latter’s demeanour was because of his appointment as Shaykh al-Islam. When queried, Najm al-Din explained his sense of inferiority at Murin al-Din’s decision to leave a disciple such as Qutb al-Din in Delhi. Murin al-Din immediately understood the nature of Najm al-Din’s complaint and resolved to take Qutb al-Din back with him when he left for Ajmer. But the story did not end here. The climax came when Najm al-Din’s efforts at purging Delhi of another Sufi Shaykh were thwarted by the spontaneous intervention of the residents of the city and Sultan Ibrahim, who beguiled Murin al-Din to leave his pupil behind with them.

The two incidents, themselves, were historical: Jalal al-Din did indeed leave Delhi for Budhun and eventually Lakhnauti; and, evidently, there was considerable animosity between Qutb al-Din Bakhtiyar Kaki and Najm al-Din Syedha. Qutb al-Din, at any rate, did not suffer expulsion and he spent his last years in Delhi. Exile from Delhi meant dishonour and expulsion from the community of Muslims resident in the town. This was an extremely serious affair, of particular significance

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Ulama like Qazi Mintaq al-Din Sira Juzjani, at one time the chief jurist of the realm, who was renowned for his sermons, knowledge of jurisprudence and, without any contradiction whatsoever, was also inclined towards the mystical path. According to Nizam al-Din Auliya, it was the Qadi who popularised the mystical ritual of the Sufis, namely, in Delhi.21 By contrast, there were Sufis like Bahas al-Din Zakariya whose own conduct was in certain spheres very close to a scriptural orthopraxis.22 Other Sufis often criticised him for his eccentric lifestyle, his accumulation of wealth and hobnobbing with the military commanders of the Delhi Sultan.23 The Ulama and the Sufis did not necessarily occupy a juxtaposed terrain. But, at the other extreme, it was not quite an open-ended world either. The mystically inclined jurist, Minhaj al-Siraj Juzjani, could condemn a Sufi like Nur Turk as a heretic and damage his reputation to such an extent that Nizam al-Din Auliya made a special effort to excommunicate the Ulama in his teachings.24 Obviously the practices of only some mystics were acceptable to jurists; others, however, were condemned. By the same token, Shyakh like Bahas al-Din Zakariya, whose mysticism was strongly influenced by a Sufi orthopraxis, could not abide the pedanticism of some prescriptive rituals. He explained how his personal practice emanated from a superior intuitive understanding of law.25 Indeed, Sufis and Ulama exulted and condemned their own and each other’s conduct. The distinctions within and between them did not necessarily prejudice their reactions one way or the other. This was certainly true in the case of Najam al-Din Auliya. As the sixteenth-century biographical encyclopedia of mystics, Shyakh e Firdawsisratiyat, the Miany al-Assafyy, brings out, the Shyakh al-Islam of Delhi was actually not one of the Ulama. He was a mystic with an erudite spiritual genealogy: a student of the great Shyakh Najam al-Din Kubra. Apparently his mystical background did not mute his decision to reproach and harass other Sufis in Delhi nor stand in the way of his appointment by the Sultan as the Shyakh al-Islam of Delhi.26

If the animosity between Sufis and the other Sufis was not caused by ingrained Ulama-Sufi distinctions, could it be that these incidents were examples of the intense rivalry amongst Sufis over charismatic presence and spiritual dominance (rilayat)? According to many scholars, conflicts over rilayats could be quite fierce. Was Najam al-Din, therefore, upset with Minhaj al-Din’s appointment of Bahashiyar Kali in Delhi, a domain that he regarded as his own particular rilayat? Was this also the reason why Jalal al-Din was forced to leave Delhi?27

The Rashid al-Mahjub, an eleventh-century Sufi text produced in Ghaznavid Lahore, describes how Sufis identified specific regions as their spiritual domains to preserve their exclusive, greatest hospitability when they were not well treated in other others’ domains.28 In the Ghiznavid era, Sufis were held in high esteem and revered for their mystical and ethical qualities. In the same era, the Ulama were holding sway over the religious and political system, and their influence spread far and wide. The Ulama were considered the ultimate authority in matters of law, religion, and governance. They were respected for their erudition and moral values. The Ulama and Sufis often interacted with each other, sometimes collaborating and at other times competing with each other. The relationship between the Ulama and Sufis was complex and dynamic, characterized by mutual respect and rivalry. The Ulama were concerned with the preservation and propagation of Islamic law and doctrine, while the Sufis focused on spiritual knowledge and personal experience. The Ulama believed that the ultimate goal of Sufism wasreklessness from one regi.

The first reference to a domain as an Islamic state that was compiled because of Sufi practice and we ascribing the politics of its north is nothing in Nizam that Jalal al-Din Tabrizi’s mystical in Nizam al-Din is the distanced Quraysh, or Sufi. Nothing remotely resets influence seems to have much to do with spiritual domination that existed during the thirteenth century. While the early eight centuries organized spiritual groups in India — not in D spiritual genealogies the Chudit usulis is recognized by al-Din Tabrizi — the the Ulama-Sufi distinction, could it be that these were different. The Ulama were examples of the intense rivalry amongst Sufis over charismatic presence and spiritual dominance (rilayat)? According to many scholars, conflicts over rilayats could be quite fierce. Was Najam al-Din, therefore, upset with Minhaj al-Din’s appointment of Bashashiyar Kali in Delhi, a domain that he regarded as his own particular rilayat? Was this also the reason why Jalal al-Din was forced to leave Delhi?27

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the conflict between the different Shaykhs in individualistic sectarian terms. It might help, on the other hand, to use the moment of rupture to analyze further the character of the Muslim community and study the contexts in which the Shaykh al-Islam possessed the ability to threaten and exile eminent Shaykhs.

The Social and Political Context

The incitement that we have been discussing occurred during the reign of Sultan Shams al-Din Ulūlīmān (1210-1231), perhaps in the 1220s or the early 1230s. The Faḍl al-Faḍl mentions no dates but we do know, even if it is without any degree of precision, that both Jalal al-Dîn Tabâbî and Bahâ'î al-Dîn Kâtîb were in Delhi during the reign of Ulūlīmān. Its account is also suggestive of the fact that the Mongol incursions into north India had already commenced. This would be post-1221, a decade that witnessed important transitions in the Sultanate of Delhi. The kingdom of Delhi was originally one of several military outposts established by the Shamsâbâdul Sultan of Ghur, Mūsâ al-Dîn Ghur (1173-1206), during his campaigns in north India. It fortuitously united the reign of Shams al-Dîn Ulūlīmān (1210-1231) when military campaigns in the first twenty years of the monarchy led to the defeat of the surviving commanders of Mūsâ al-Dîn and the emergence of a paramount Sultanate of Delhi. With the annexation of these rival settlements by the late-1220s, the authority of Delhi expanded to include a diverse collection of people resident in areas as far away as Sind in the west and Bengal to the east.

Integrating this dominion as a composite Sultanate of Delhi was a huge challenge. The urban residents of the newly annexed settlements had already experienced several decades of stable political and economic life under their respective commanders. They had few ties with Shams al-Dîn Ulūlīmān, their new and very distant Sultan of Delhi. But the problems of consolidating the newly conquered territories and subjects within a composite Sultanate of Delhi were further complicated with the beginning of the Mongol invasions in 1220. Through the following decade, cities in north India received a flood of immigrants from eastern Iran, Khurasan, Transoxiana, and Afghanistan. These were 'Muslims' from diverse ethnic, class and regional backgrounds, groups of dispossessed people shifting few, if any, social ties with each other. Their arrival in recently annexed domains of the Delhi Sultanate immediately made the composition of his subjects even more complex and complicated the problem of integrating them into a composite Sultanate.

Consolidating the domains of the Delhi Sultan in the 1220s was also a difficult exercise because the Sultanate was still a looser assembly of urban centres with far more variations. It was still not possible to control the vast expanse of the domains during the longrawn process. The Delhi Sultanate, with its wide-ranging political and social networks, was more like a giant, with its own internal, internal, and external pressures, and a vast range of political and social networks. The Delhi Sultanate was still a looser assembly of urban centres with far more variations. It was still not possible to control the vast expanse of the domains during the longrawn process.

Other than suggesting that the new urban centres of Delhi had a different cultural and social makeup, it became clear that the Sultanate was no longer the diverse collection of people resident in areas as far away as Sind in the west and Bengal to the east. It was a vast empire with diverse cultures and social networks. The Delhi Sultanate was still a looser assembly of urban centres with far more variations. It was still not possible to control the vast expanse of the domains during the longrawn process. The Delhi Sultanate, with its wide-ranging political and social networks, was more like a giant, with its own internal, internal, and external pressures, and a vast range of political and social networks. The Delhi Sultanate was still a looser assembly of urban centres with far more variations. It was still not possible to control the vast expanse of the domains during the longrawn process.
between aristocrats and slaves was invented in an interesting way during the early Sultanate. Turkish slaves—implied in their social standing—commanded power and wealth. The aristocrats of learning served them and mastered a foreign language to acquire patronage and honor. This is notable that while this 'social inversion' might have perturbed some of the Persian literati, it did not deter the likes of Fakhr-i-Mudabbir himself, or Mihrād Sīrū Juzjāni, who invested large parts of their life in the service of Turkish slave masters. The tensions present in this world, however, were captured in verse and recounted by Nizam al-Din Awliya to the congregation present in his hospice—in an environment that was more than a little ambivalent about the grandeur of the Sultan's court. The verse was addressed to Hamid, a Persian secretary who served Sūrkhā, his Turkish master.

Oh Hamid! why are you standing before this man?... You are a learned man and he is ignorant, you are a free man and he is a slave, you are a pious man and he is an unlearned sinner.

In a pithy Nizam al-Din captured the flimsy foundations upon which Sultanate authority rested. It may have possessed brute military power, but the templates that assessed an individual's worth by his learning, pietistic inclinations and genealogy were unimpressed by the claims of slaves to command by force of arms. Certainiy they were not the people qualified to lead the Muslim community as moral exemplars; they were Amirs and Malikī, possessors of wealth and power but not sharī'ī, hurū'ī, learned, respected elders of the community.

Defining Orthopraxis: the role of Shaykh al-Islām

If Nizam's words subordinates included the learning and culture to appear as moral exemplars, it made their task of appearing as leaders of their subjects incredibly difficult. It did not lead to a situation, however, where Muslim communities were left without guidance. They recognized Shaykhs and Ulema as learned men, individuals whose training in law, history, theology and mysticism helped in charting a path through which Muslims could reproduce a culture and habitat in north India that was so violently uprooted by the Mongol invasions in eastern Iran and Afghanistan. The catastrophic destruction of their homelands and the trauma of immigration was for many of them the harbinger of the Day of Judgment. It was during this moment of despair that they turned to their community leaders for reassurance and guidance.

On the face of it there was probably very little to distinguish between these community leaders. Broadly speaking, they had a similar kind of education in the Qur'an of law. Gaining such an education for the sake of the nature of the implied travelling in search of teaching, the education and literacy of the scholars, who learned individual, the students of jurisprudence, collected meanings of the texts and taught students in a manner against sometimes a scholar's students or masters, at training in classical juridical mystic's discourse.

In the context of described the complexity and the leaders were seen as 'Shārī'-minded', behavior, accepted as 'mystical-minded', conformed to, or accepted as religious leaders at times blameworthy and took guidance from those who accept the other, or even reject conformity in the human community. This is an approach to those Muslims.

Indeed, Muslim interests from the positions of internal disputes Especially in the conflict, the differences understood, such as the social practices and textual canons defined means to challenging
modern sources such as the Shaykh al-Islam in order to make further and earnest hatred. The physician's knowledge of the Arabic language, his study to the local Shirazi and the others, human beings in order to make further and earnest hatred. The physician's knowledge of the Arabic language, his study the Shirazi and the others, human beings in order to make further and earnest hatred. The physician's knowledge of the Arabic language, his study

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that made it impossible for Jalal ad-Din Tahir to remain in Delhi. The Firdawsí biographical encyclopedia praised Naim ad-Din Sughrá as a "great man, a saint" also sharply criticized Qulub ad-Din Badhhatyar Kaki for the hold he had acquired over the people of Delhi by the display of miraculous powers. Not only was Qulub ad-Din feared but in gaining adherents the Shaykh was also undermining Islam and the Shari’ah principles that sustained the community of Muslims. It is hardly surprising that later Chahāt and Subhārwardy were reaction so strongly to Naim ad-Din Sughrá’s persecution and provided such a hostile account of his conduct. Nor is it shocking to find that the Firdawsí was not responded to this assault and tried to restore its credibility.

The evidence from the early thirteenth century does suggest that charismatic Sufis — ploutocratic Muslims who claimed a lineage of saintly ancestors and believed because of their special intuitive powers — were particularly persecuted in Ilutmish’s reign. In this context we can appreciate the impact of Nizam ad-Din Awliya’s remark that the jurist Minaj-i Siraj uz Zanjani should have been a Shaykh ad-Islam and not a mere Qazi. Having been a Shaykh himself his personal evaluation of conduct would have been influenced more by his well-known Sufi leanings rather than a scriptural understanding of Islam. Nizam ad-Din Awliya’s wish was a pious hope of a different configuration of forms that would have enabled the triumph of mystical Islam — rather than Shari’ah orthodoxy — in Delhi.

In summarizing the episodes surrounding Badhhatyar Kaki, Jalal ad-Din Tahir and Naim ad-Din Sughrá, the Chahāt and Subhārwardy were inadvertently highlighting their discontent with the nature of piety dominant in Delhi. The intensity of opposition to the imposition of an "authoritative" Islamic form is apparent from the reports of an incident in which an armed body of Muslims attacked the congregational mosque in the city sometime in 1235, the end of Ilutmish’s reign and accession of Sultan Raziyar. In the earlier, contemporary report of the event provided by the jurist Minaj-i Siraj uz Zanjani, a Shi‘i theological named Nur Turk provided the attack. According to Minaj, Nur Turk was an extraordinary preacher who convinced his followers that the Shahī and Hamadani Ulama in the Delhi mosque were misrepresenting Islam and leading the community into error. In the alternative report provided by Nizam ad-Din Awliya, Nur Turk was actually a Sufi whose piety was as pure as the dew from heaven. Nizam ad-Din Awliya himself glossed over the incident of the armed attack on the mosque and suggested that this was a counter (caused by the Ulama to defeat Sufism). Instead, he spoke approvingly of Nur Turk’s piety and his public challenge of the worldly manoeuvres of the Ulama of the city. By contrast, Qulub ad-Din Tahir praised the armed dispersal and death of the heretics.
monarch preserved the greatest of decorum in his personal dealings with all the piety minded in his realm and seems to have, in fact, suggested that his accession to the throne was made possible through the divine benediction of great Sufi masters. But, despite the efforts of Sufi texts to suggest the Sultan monarch's leanings towards mysticism and Sufi Shaikhs, Ilutmish appears to have been very careful not to appear as the patron of any Shaikh. Court eulogists might have found spiritual intercession a useful trope to suppress memories of a contested accession and mystical visions of the Prophet added pious lustre to his construction of a community reservoir in the capital. But his public declarations regarding the duties incumbent on all Muslims unequivocally stressed the congregational aspects of Islam and the prescriptive injunctions of the Sharia. He invested huge sums on public projects that could function as centres of community organisation and socialisation. Congregational mosques, schools and madrasas, community festival grounds, were constructed in Delhi and other cities of the realm. These were places where social interaction as well as social reproduction could be efficiently engineered. And, as his decision to honour Najm al-Din Sughrta as Delhi's Shaikhs al-islam reveals, Ilutmish left little to chance. His support to the structures and agencies that enforced a textually defined social orthopraxis rather than any intuitively inspired interpretation of faith, effectively challenged the foundations upon which many charismatic pious Shaikhs leveraged their teaching of Islam and established their separate fractuaries. The conundrums of interests between the Sharia-minded pious Muslims and the state served to map boundaries of righteous conduct that also framed the outlines of the Muslim community. A united Muslim community protected by a powerful state, ruled by a pious monarch served as a powerful contrast to the destruction of Muslim homelands in Iran and Afghanistan. Juzjani tried to get as much mileage out of this imagery as possible, but the Muslims terrified by the impending holocaust were often assuaged by the charisma of Shaikhs, whose miracles testified to their proximity to God. Socially cognizable conduct that abided by the Holy Law was all very well in its own place but at a time when the Hereafter was upon them, many Muslims sought the reassurance of their Shaikhs as an intercessor with God.

Politics and Society: Hindu-Muslim relations reconsidered

The literature generated within the circle of the Delhi court made little effort to clarify the processes or justify the imposition of the structures and boundaries that defined the community of Muslims. It celebrated the emergence of Delhi as the 'Axis of Islam' as a self-evident fact that needed little clarification. Why a diverse body of Muslims dispersed in distant countries lived together as one people was not a matter for discussion. The question of the effect on the two communities of Hindu traditions and Muslim orthopraxis was abstracted simply as a functional matter of surmise. The Hindu majority, if the Muslims had no business being Muslims at all, then the idea of the Muslim minority in the city as a community that could behud according to contemporary religious and political preoccupations was of no great consequence.
distant castes in north India should regard Delhi as the hub of their lives, a place where Muslims were guests of sanctity in troubled times. It was a place where the Muslim community rediscovered its strength and unity through the construction of a Shari'ah-based orthodoxy that was able to confine upon it a sense of normality and timelessness.

The synchronic nature of Persian chronicles made it possible for their authors to negotiate the politics of their present in a variety of ways. Not the least of the unhappy realities of their times concerned deep divisions within the Muslim community and the inadequate quasification of its political masters to cohere its constituent parts. The eighteenth-century period of political struggle in the Deccan is by no means the ideal world, whose commentaries, and the fixed political arrangements it implied, were to be the focus of the new rulers in the South. It should be evident that the period of the Mughal invasions, however, is the one in which the Muslim community may be considered as one of the forces that were to bring about a merger of the religious and political orders in the South. The Mughals and the Muslims were not only the conquerors of the land but also the primary beneficiaries of the new political order. The period of the Mughal invasions, in which the Muslims were not only the conquerors of the land but also the primary beneficiaries of the new political order, was the one in which the Muslim community may be considered as one of the forces that were to bring about a merger of the religious and political orders in the South. The Mughals and the Muslims were not only the conquerors of the land but also the primary beneficiaries of the new political order.

Paradoxically, the usurpation of political initiative by subjects — rebellions — was often explained as a consequence of an anomalous conduct from kings and their agents. They had given up the path of the Sufis and their exiles favored their subjects to extreme action. Thus, depending upon the political leanings of the Mughals, Shahjahan or his successors, were able to the achievement of moderate virtuous, but not a realization of the ambitious interventions in the affairs of religion and social transactions — their efficient management of public administration notwithstanding — marked him as an irreligious despot. There had been rulers of this nature in the past and this history merely recorded the transport impact of human frailties.

The depoliticization of the Muslim community made rebellion, hindrances, and the inevitable. The juridical reasoning arguing for the preservation of the Muslim community contained stability and consensus together in a milieu that was outside history and debate. Would conditions ever change, making such a compromise unnecessary? Not within the horizon of the Muslim community in India between the thirteenth through the sixteenth centuries. The implications of this theoretical opposition anesthetized internal disputes within the community and left it unreported. The attempt to reconcile Jalal al-Din Tahir's exiles and the events leading up to it had two hypothetical options: he could see the Sufis as his heretics, or say it was unjustified for one of his agents as a pretext of punishment of excesses. As it happened, Jalal al-Din's case was never reported in the Persian histories of the day and the Sufis accounts that did carry it, universally ascribed the whole incident to the Delhi Sufi's petty and jealous character. As a result, the pristine, monolithic character of the Muslim community remained unattained and the whole episode was brushed aside as an example of 'excesses' of a person unqualified to hold public office.

Alternatively, rebellions could also be grouped by people who had never accepted the moral legitimacy of the Muslim social world. Conventionally, they were described either as Sufis heretics (Jujum's Qarmatians), rationalist philosophers or Hindu infiltrates. Although the former two theoretically were Muslims, they were outside the pale of the Sunni-jama'at moral order and their expulsion was a relatively straightforward way of securing the community. More problematic were the large number of non-Muslim 'Hindus' who could be suffered only if they accepted Islam. Or as the classic Hanafite position allowed: recognize them as one of the 'people of the book', a dependent, subject race who paid the jizya tax. Both positions were resurrected time and again, debated and used to underline and homogenize 'difference'. An equally classic trope was carried in the recurring admonition in the Sunnite texts that rulers could only be great by Muslim Sultans if they constantly chastened Hindus and, like the paradigmatic Mahmud of Ghazni, destroyed their temples.

The large-scale reporting of conflict between the 'army of Islam' and non-Muslims was in marked contrast to the discreet acknowledgment of discord within the Muslim community. In the context of the Mongol invasions, non-Muslims were cast as the greatest, if not the only, threat to the community of Muslims and the Sunnites. The Mongols and the Hindus were mercilessly joined together into a composite 'Other' and if Jujum's exhortation delivered on January 17, 1299 — summarizing Muslims to holy warfare and the merit of fighting against Hindus — to defend the glory of Islam and serve the sublime court and obey the orders of their commanders — had been less explicit in its contextualization, the reader could mistakenly assume that the infidels under discussion in this passage were the Hindus and not the Mongols. Ironically, this thesis also provided the rhetorical space to demand cohesiveness within the Muslim community. Jujum's exhortations, for example, were necessary to raise the morale of the believers and galvanize them into superhuman endeavour against the enemy of Islam. In other words, the non-believer, Hindu or Mongol, served the crucial positive role of cohesive and pious renunciation of the idolatry's one of the ways in which they were deployed as a reform chosen community — a conflict with peopled anent into the community's Sunnis-jama'at.

With the state a projection of the state, the state in its self-consciousness as the political, religious and philosophic interest in the life of the monolithic Mughal reality of the community perhaps was a reality of the world of Islam. The Mughals and the Muslims were not only the conquerors of the land but also the primary beneficiaries of the new political order. The period of the Mughal invasions, in which the Muslims were not only the conquerors of the land but also the primary beneficiaries of the new political order, was the one in which the Muslim community may be considered as one of the forces that were to bring about a merger of the religious and political orders in the South. The Mughals and the Muslims were not only the conquerors of the land but also the primary beneficiaries of the new political order.

My own interpretation of the history of the Mughals and the Muslims is that the Mughal and Hindu received a wider censure cosmopolitan depiction, Engaged in
Jalal al-Din المالكي’s political options: the illusion of one or two. As it happened, the history of the Muslim community witnessed a period of yoked subjection and piety. The Mughal emperor Akbar’s. dramatic assertion of order was only one of the ways in which the threat of external ‘Other’ could be deployed as a reformist trope to undermine the traditional social fabric of the community. But narratives that underlined ‘difference’ and ‘otherness’ with a community that did not know the complex terrain of distinguishing similar. 

With the state as the principal political actor in South Asia and the protection of the community of Muslims as its primary aim, it was always at odds in an offensive or defensive engagement with non-Muslims. Modern positive historiographical methodologies, especially if they belonged to secular traditions, had the greatest difficulty in dealing with these materials. Here, we see some of the orthodox historians of the Muslim community that the state was not organized along the bigoted principles reported in most court diaries. Power and politics were distant from the concerns of Sadia. It was a search for social union that animated their lives. But their arguments consolidated the secular world of the social and political religion and the state — the intention of medieval political philosophers in the first place. Other empirical temperaments account of the Muslim population of the subcontinent. While the contours of the medieval Muslim state by suggesting that it engaged in a variety of realistic pragmatic relationships with the multi-religious population of the subcontinent. The testimony accords with the hypothesis that the state was not organized along the bigoted principles reported in most court diaries. Power and politics were distant from the concerns of Sadia. It was a search for social union that animated their lives. But their arguments consolidated the secular world of the social and political religion and the state — the intention of medieval political philosophers in the first place. Other empirical temperaments account of the Muslim population of the subcontinent. While the contours of the medieval Muslim state by suggesting that it engaged in a variety of realistic pragmatic relationships with the multi-religious population of the subcontinent. The testimony accords with the hypothesis that the state was not organized along the bigoted principles reported in most court diaries. Power and politics were distant from the concerns of Sadia. It was a search for social union that animated their lives. But their arguments consolidated the secular world of the social and political religion and the state — the intention of medieval political philosophers in the first place. Other empirical temperaments account of the Muslim population of the subcontinent.
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15. The Feroz-ud-Din was completed in 1522 and the Sijar al-Akhbar in circa 1380. The details concerning Jala-al-Din Tabrizi’s conflict with Najm al-Din Sughrwa are elaborated in the early sixteenth-century tahzib al-Nazir al-Adil in the year 1356, Sijar al-Akhbar, Delhi, 1311/1393, pp. 13-1664.

16. Sijir, Feroz-ud-Din, p. 245.
19. To be fair, these binary distinctions are present in Nizam al-Din Awliya’s discourse as well. At one point, Sijir cites him mentioning that ‘Sufis were ‘alams of love’ (people of love) and the Ulama were ‘alams of intellect’ (people of intellect). See Sijir, Feroz-ud-Din, p. 226. In his larger narrative, however, the distinctions between the Sufis and Ulama were not nearly so simple or clear. The two practices frequently informed each other’s beliefs just as an olive could sometimes choose to be a fruit. For a further development of these ideas, see below. For the conventional historiographical position, from any viewpoint, see R. A. Naqvi. Some Aspects of Religion and Politics in India during the Thirteenth Century, Delhi, 1961, 1974 reprint and M. Mujeeb, ‘The Muslim Mughal, Morozia, 1967.
21. On Nizam’s interest in completing the prescribed rituals associated with prayer, see, pp. 291.
22. Note especially the critical letter written by Jala-al-Din Tabrizi to Sula in which he assures his choice of ‘a man of the west’. Ibid, p. 172.
24. Sijir, Feroz-ud-Din, pp. 399-400.
27. Sijir, Feroz-ud-Din, p. 354. See below for a fuller discussion.
29. On the court chronicles ignoring this challenge, see, pp. 88 and for example the narrative, in which Nizam-ud-Din Haider’s wife is a holy woman, in Nizam’s Suli Sheikhs as a source of Authority in Medieval India, Penmarkla, Islam and Society in Asia des, 9 (1965), p. 65, reprinted in India’s Islamic Traditions, p. 245. Naja al-Din in Kher in the second instance is a typographical error for Naja al-Din Sughrwa.
31. Sijir, Feroz-ud-Din, p. 354. See below for a fuller discussion.
33. Sijir, Feroz-ud-Din, p. 399-400.
36. Sijir, Feroz-ud-Din, p. 354. See below for a fuller discussion.
38. Sijir, Feroz-ud-Din, p. 399-400.
41. Sijir, Feroz-ud-Din, p. 354. See below for a fuller discussion.
43. Sijir, Feroz-ud-Din, p. 399-400.
46. Sijir, Feroz-ud-Din, p. 354. See below for a fuller discussion.
48. Sijir, Feroz-ud-Din, p. 399-400.
51. Sijir, Feroz-ud-Din, p. 354. See below for a fuller discussion.
53. Sijir, Feroz-ud-Din, p. 399-400.
The ambiguity comes from such a statement, the Muslim community and Hindu-Muslim...
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70. Jaspal, The Muslim, p. 15, has an elaborate story with the<br>

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Siyar al-'Arifin, p. 25; Ishani, Fathul al-Sa'ahin, p. 118, has an elaborate<br>

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For a discussion of the various construction and epigraphic arguments, see<br>

Kumars, Emergence of the Delhi Sultanate, Chapter 3 and Sunil Kumar, 'Qua<br>


58. This is succinctly brought out by Digby, 'Safi Shahzad as a Source of<br>

Authority', Parsarnad, p. 62; India's Islamic Traditions, p. 241.

59. The most influential articulation of this idea was by al-Mawardi, Alin<br>


60. If any ruler proves himself stronger (at a given moment) and demands taxes from you and protects you, you must hand over the tax and thus save yourselves. Why do you not consider the example of the man of Nishapur and of other cities, who submitted? They acted quite right in doing that, so that no plundering took place'. See C.E. Bosworth, The Ghaznavids and their Empire in Afghanistan and Eastern Iran, 999-1100, Beirut, 2nd edition, 1973, p. 263.

61. For a rare collision of material regarding the plebs qualita of<br>

Sultan Ilutmish, see K.A. Nizami, Religious Life and Learning of<br>

Brahmans in India, in M.D. Kaur, ed.), The Making of Indo-<br>

Persian Culture, Delhi, 2000, pp. 37-48. More generally, see Peter Hardy, Historians of Medieval India.


63. For a discussion of the juridical position of 'Hindus' as 'people of the<br>


64. A useful analysis of Ghaznavid renditions of Muhammad's Somnath expedition is now available in Richard Davis, Laws of Indian Image, Delhi, 1997.


66. For a discussion of the juridical position of 'Hindus' as 'people of the<br>


68. For a discussion of the juridical position of 'Hindus' as 'people of the<br>


70. Jaspal, The Muslim, p. 15, has an elaborate story with the<br>

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